We consider incentives for organizing competitions in multiple rounds, focusing on situations where there is heterogeneity among the contestants ex ante, which discourages e¤ort in a single contest. Heterogeneity evolves across rounds depending upon the outcomes of previous rounds. We present conditions under which balance in such a competition can be created, by determining the number of rounds and dividing the prize fund carefully across them, so that full rent dissipation entails. In the model, each round is an all-pay auction where contestants di¤er in their abilities to gain a momentum from winning. We also discuss the case when negative prizes are feasible, demonstrating that this strengthens the full dissipation result; and we consider a case where the size of the winner's momentum is related to the size of the prize attained, showing that the stronger this linkage, the less of the prize is awarded early on.
Introduction
Many competitions are organized in multiple rounds. A challenge with this practice is the di¢ culty of keeping up the e¤orts of the players as the competition advances in situations where an early loss discourages a player from putting in e¤ort in later rounds (Konrad, 2012) . When this so-called discouragement e¤ect is strong, there may be cause to organize the competition as one grand singlestage contest. When multiple-round competitions are so prevalent, this may be for reasons such as convexity of per-round e¤ort costs; budget constraints on the part of contestants, organizer, or both; or the need for the organizer to keep the suspense, which is likely a crucial argument for organizers of sport competitions living o¤ of the audience that the competitions attract. 1 In this paper, we point to still another reason for organizing a multi-round competition: When contestants come to a competition with ex-ante di¤erences in abilities, these di¤erences in themselves may be discouraging. 2 We point to circumstances where, by organizing a competition in multiple rounds, the organizer can not only attenuate the discouragement e¤ect stemming from such di¤erences but even lift overall e¤orts so much that full rent dissipation entails. This may happen when the ex-ante laggard would get a higher boost in his skills from an early win than the ex-ante leader would. This second asymmetry between the contestants creates a scope for the organizer to make use of two or more rounds and split the prize fund across these rounds in such a way that the initial round becomes a balanced contest.
In order to discuss this, we present a model of several rounds of all-pay auctions between two contestants who are di¤erent along two dimensions: the productivity of their e¤orts at the outset, and the ability to obtain a boost in this productivity at later stages from an early win. The principal, who organizes the competition, has available a …xed prize fund to distribute across the sequence of contests with the aim of maximizing total overall expected e¤orts, subject to an overall budget constraint and (initially) a non-negativity constraint on each round's prize.
We …nd that the principal is able to obtain full rent dissipation -with total expected e¤orts among the players equal to the prize fund -when the ex-ante heterogeneity in productivity is small enough and the ex-ante disadvantaged contestant is su¢ ciently better at gaining a boost from winning. When this is the case, the principal is able to distribute the prize fund such that the various skills of the two contestants are exactly balanced in the …rst contest in the sequence and there will be full rent dissipation, with total expected e¤orts among the players equal to the prize fund. Moreover, we …nd that the extent to which full rent dissipation is achievable is increased when it is possible to organize the competition over a longer sequence of contests.
The central notion for the possibility of full rent dissipation is that of a balanced contest. Of course, a symmetric contest is balanced. In order to obtain balance in the …rst contest when there are ex-ante asymmetries that are not easily corrected, the underdog must have a greater gain from winning that contest, so that he can catch up with and leapfrog the better rival. When this is the case, there is a scope for splitting the prize fund across the contests such that a balanced …rst contest is created. For the two-contest case, we o¤er in addition a complete characterization of the optimal organization of the contest. For an intermediate range of the exante heterogeneity where full rent dissipation is not possible, we …nd that the principal should put all the prize fund in the second contest, while for large such heterogeneity, the best is to have all the prize fund in the …rst contest, essentially closing down the second one and run a single contest. We also discuss extensions of our model to the case where the boost gained from winning depends on the size of the prize won, as well as the case where a prize may be negative.
Our analysis is of relevance to many kinds of competition where designers face heterogeneous contestants. Consider, in particular, competitions for research grants, commonly organized by research councils and similar entities. It has long been recognized, at least since Merton (1968) coined the concept of the Matthew e¤ect, that there are win e¤ects in the competition for research grants. 3 As noted by Gallini and Scotchmer (2002; p. 54) , "future grants are contingent upon previous success. The linkage between previous success and future funding seems even more speci…c in the case of the National Science Council". Those who succeed in obtaining research grants may experience an increase in status, winning a grant to fund current work and build up a competent research team, which again improves their chance of winning further grants. Losing teams must use time and resources in seeking presumably inferior forms of funding; in sum, this gives an advantage in future rounds of competition for scarce research funding. Our analysis points to a scope for attenuating the Matthew e¤ect, and even obtain full rent dissipation, by carrying out a research program across several rounds of contests for funds and carefully spreading out the total research budget across these rounds. Taking this view might lead to a distribution of research funds that is less susceptible to discouragement among initial laggards, both for research councils and for organizers of related competitions, such as innovation contests.
better access to back-o¢ ce resources, more training than the less successful, and better territories; see, e.g., Skiera and Albers (1998), Farrell and Hakstian (2001) , and Krishnamoorthy, et al. (2005) . This is, again, a mechanism in which winning creates winners, and using several rounds of contests among the sales force may be what is needed in order to create a balanced contest in order to keep total e¤orts high.
6 Our model may also be applied to franchising, which is suggested by Gillis et al. (2011) to resemble a dynamic tournament setting. Franchisees compete with each other in order to gain more units in the franchise, as a prize for good relative performance over time. Initially, one franchisee may have an advantage over rivals due to location or other factors, and the franchisor can reward the high performer with another franchise unit. This allows the winner to build a business and enjoy economies of scale, scope and/or management in future contests. The franchisor must determine when, and how large a franchise to award. In our analysis, we show that several reward schemes can induce maximal expected e¤ort; some of these involve periods of e¤ort in which no direct prize (franchise) is awarded, but where rivals seek to build their claims for the next prize.
The paper closest to ours is , which analyzes a similar setting to the present one, except that the heterogeneities there are with respect to additive head starts rather than multiplicative productivity biases. In particular, one player has an ex-ante head start, while the players also di¤er in their gains from an early win. Also there, full rent dissipation can be obtained through an optimum distribution of the prize budget if the ex-ante heterogeneity is small enough. Although results are similar for the two-contest case, the mechanisms di¤er. With head starts, cases may occur where the leading player has such a big lead that he can win without exerting e¤ort, simply trusting his head start, and the principal must take such cases, that would entail low total expected e¤orts, into account when designing the competition. This issue does not show up in the present case of productivity biases. One e¤ect of this di¤erence is that we here are able to get out some results for longer competitions, that is, sequences of three or more contests, thus being able to discuss the merits of such long competitions, while the other paper is limited to the analysis of the two-contest case.
A precursor to both these papers is Clark and Nilssen (2018) , which analyzes a sequence of all-pay auctions with win advantages, but where prizes are constant across time and players are identical. In particular, players obtain the same head start and/or productivity boost from winning a contest. In that paper, the design issue that we focus on presently does not appear, since identical players imply that the …rst contest is always balanced and therefore that there is always full rent dissipation in equilibrium. Instead, the focus is on the extent to which an initial laggard will stay in the game and eventually have higher expected e¤orts than the leader.
7 Clark and Nilssen (2018) …nd that heterogeneity between the 6 Our analysis can also …nd application in political competition, where the winner of a …rst election may gain additional media attention and funding from campaign contributors which helps to build future momentum (see Strumpf, 2002) . 7 Clark, et al. (2019) discuss a sequence of two Tullock contests in which the winner of the …rst has a lower cost of exerting e¤ort in the second or a higher win probability compared to ex ante symmetric rivals. In that model, with no discounting of future payo¤s, the optimum for rivals occurring throughout the competition as wins and losses are recorded can reduce their e¤orts since the weaker player reduces e¤orts due to a perceived increase in the probability of losing, and the stronger player reduces e¤ort as a response.
8 Counteracting this mechanism through the contest design is a key issue in the current paper.
Other papers that discuss design in heterogeneous all-pay auctions have focused on how the principal can optimally set, or reset, biases in order to maximize total expected e¤orts; see, e.g., Epstein, et al. (2011), Li and Yu (2012) , and Franke, et al. (2018) . 9 This approach di¤ers from ours, in that we take the view that biases are …xed and not possible to adjust directly and rather explore how, in dynamic competitions, distributing the prize fund across time can a¤ect total expected e¤orts. A complicating -but realistic -factor in our analysis is that rivals have di¤erent productivities of e¤ort initially, and that these evolve at di¤erent rates as the series of contests progresses. Contestants improve their e¤ort productivity over time in relation to the pattern of losses and wins, and this opens up for the possibility that a productivity advantage may be enhanced, neutralized or overturned in the course of the play. As Rigney (2010; p. 1) puts it, "[i]nitial advantage does not always lead to further advantage, and initial disadvantage does not always lead to further disadvantage".
10
Our work also relates to Fudenberg, et al. (1983) . In one version of their patent race, competitors must progress through discrete stages in order to secure the …nal invention. They assume that a laggard may probabilistically complete a necessary stage in the race before the …rm with ex-ante higher expected value, giving it an advantage since it can start work on the next stage in the process. In some competitions, successful players may gain access to material goods that make competing easier. Similarly, Konrad and Kovenock (2010) show that the discouragement e¤ect in sequential contests can be mitigated if contestants'abilities are not constant, and rather the result of a stochastic process. This ensures that there are situations in which an underdog may be more able than the favorite on a given day, leading to less pronounced discouragement.
For most of our analysis, we assume that the size of the momentum gained by a contest winner is independent of the size of the prize actually won. Möller (2012) , Beviá and Corchón (2013) , and Luo and Xie (2018) present two interlinked Tullock contests in which the size of the prize attained in the …rst a¤ects the probability of winning in the second. We show that our result of attaining contest balance and full rent dissipation also holds for a series of all-pay auctions when the size of the winner's momentum is directly related to the early prize won.
A further extension that we explore is that of a negative prize in the …rst contest with a …xed budget constraint, a notion that is similar to the idea pursued by the principal is to put the prize fund into the second contest.
8 A similar mechanism is noted in the innovation tournament of Terwiesch and Xu (2008) . 9 See also the surveys by Mealem and Nitzan (2016) and Chowdhury, et al. (2019) . 10 When the direction and magnitude of the contestants' heterogenity evolves, the principal must continually rebias contest e¤orts if this is the instrument being used. This may be seen as a rather erratic policy in which the favoured contestant constantly changes. Our approach in this setting is simple, involving only a division of the prize mass over contest rounds. Mealem and Nitzan (2016) involving taxation of contest prizes. Clearly, there are many circumstances in which negative prizes are not feasible, including the applications mentioned above of research competitions and internal labour markets. Still, it is of value to note our …nding that allowing negative prizes may greatly expand the range of parameters for which full rent dissipation occurs.
Our paper also joins a growing literature that discusses sequential competition, and stands out since it tackles the design issue of how to distribute a prize mass over a sequence of contests, where also the number of contests is a design variable. Several papers assume a structure in which a certain number of rounds (often termed battles) must be won in order to achieve an overall prize (Klumpp and Polborn, 2006; Konrad and Kovenock, 2009; Sela, 2011) . Taking a di¤erent approach, Feng and Lu (2018) allow the prize achieved to be a non-decreasing function of the number of component battles won in a three-stage contest. They …nd that intermediate prizes in component battles may be awarded as a way of mitigating the discouragement e¤ect; see also Konrad and Kovenock (2009) .
Similarly to us, Fu and Lu (2012) allow a principal to choose the number of contests and how to divide the prize mass between them; since they consider an elimination tournament, the principal can also decide the number of participants remaining at each stage. The component battle is a Tullock contest, and the results echo those of Feng and Lu (2018) : low discriminatory power in the contest success function tends to lead to a single contest being optimal, whereas higher levels of discriminatory power make the multi-contest environment more e¢ cient at eliciting e¤ort.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we o¤er a preliminary analysis of the stage game. In Section 3, we present our model of the two-contest competition and provide a complete solution for the principal's optimum distribution of the prize fund. Section 4 extends the analysis to more than two contests, limiting the discussion to …nding conditions such that full rent dissipation is feasible. Section 5 discusses two extensions of our analysis; one allowing negative stage prizes, and one allowing the momentum that the …rst-contest winner achieves to depend on the size of the prize at that stage. Section 6 o¤ers some concluding remarks, while proofs are relegated to an Appendix.
Preliminaries
There are two risk-neutral players, s and w, who compete for a prize that they value at v s > 0 and v w > 0, respectively, by making irreversible e¤orts x s 0 and x w 0. The probability that player s wins the prize is
where i > 0 is a bias parameter in favour of player i 2 fs; wg, and the probability that w wins is p w = 1 p s . We assume that s v s w v w , implying that player s is the stronger one. The expected payo¤s of the two players are given by
This game has a unique equilibrium, which is described in Lemma 1 in the Appendix. In this equilibrium, the expected e¤orts of the players are 
and probabilities of winning are
From (1), we have that the total expected e¤ort is
We say the contest is balanced when
It follows from the above that, in a balanced contest,
s = w = 0; and p s = p w = 1 2 :
As discussed in the Introduction, the notion of a balanced contest is crucial for the principal's search for full rent dissipation. Note that, in a biased contest, total expected e¤ort (4) is a fraction of the average valuation of the prize. Balancing the contest yields expected e¤orts equal to the players'average valuation. We will return to this below. The above simple all-pay auction with biases comprises the stage game of our analysis in the next sections.
The two-contest model
We start our analysis by completely solving the model for the case of two contests, identifying conditions under which the expected total e¤orts are equal to the value of the total prize mass. There are two risk-neutral players, i 2 f1; 2g, who compete in two successive contests, t 2 f1; 2g, by making irreversible e¤orts, x i;t . The two players di¤er in two respects: in the biases they have before the game starts, and in the bias they can obtain before contest two by winning contest one. A principal has a prize mass of size one to divide between the two contests, making (1 v) available in the …rst, and v in the second; for now we assume non-negative prizes,
Only e¤orts in the current contest a¤ect the probability of winning, but do so according to a biased version of the all-pay auction. One of the players -player 1, without loss of generality -has a positive bias in contest one, so that the contest success function of player 1 is 1;1 (x 1;1 ; x 2;1 ) = if bx 1;1 = x 2;1 ; 0 if bx 1;1 < x 2;1 ; (7) where b > 1 is the bias in favour of player 1 in contest one; the contest success function of player 2, here and throughout, is 2;1 (x 1;1 ; x 2;1 ) = 1 1;1 (x 1;1 ; x 2;1 ). In contest two, the bias develops according to who has won the …rst contest. Should the already advantaged player 1 win the …rst contest, then his bias parameter is increased by a factor of a 1 > 1 to a 1 b. Should the initial laggard, player 2, win the …rst contest, then he has a bias parameter of a 2 > 1 in contest two, and player 1 retains his bias of b. Hence the probability that player 1 wins the second contest, having won the …rst, is 1;2 (x 1;2 ; x 2;2 ; 1) =
< :
1 if a 1 bx 1;2 > x 2;2 ; 1 2 if a 1 bx 1;2 = x 2;2 ; 0 if a 1 bx 1;2 < x 2;2 ; whilst the probability that player 1 wins the second contest after the opponent has won the …rst is 1;2 (x 1;2 ; x 2;2 ; 2) = 8 < : 1 if bx 1;2 > a 2 x 2;2 ; 1 2 if bx 1;2 = a 2 x 2;2 ; 0 if bx 1;2 < a 2 x 2;2 :
Denote by i;2 (i) the payo¤ of player i in the second contest having won the …rst, and i;2 (j) the corresponding payo¤ if i lost the …rst contest.
11 Seen from contest one, the expected payo¤ functions of player i can be written as
Winning the …rst contest gives the current prize 1 v and the expected payo¤ in the second contest having won the …rst; losing the …rst contest gives only the continuation value of proceeding to the second contest as the loser of the …rst. The value V i;1 is the total value that player i …ghts for in the …rst contest, consisting of the …rst contest prize, and the payo¤ di¤erence in the second contest between winning and losing the …rst one. The model is solved by backwards induction, starting in the second contest. Proposition 1 characterizes the optimal prize split between the two contests as well as the total expected e¤orts.
Proposition 1 In the two-contest model, the optimal setting of v, and the corresponding realized total expected e¤orts, are as follows:
(i) If
with total expected e¤orts 1, where
(ii) If
, then v = 1, with total expected e¤orts
, then v 2 [0; 1], with total expected e¤orts
, then v = 0, with total expected e¤orts 1 b . Figure 1 gives an illustration of the results, depending on the value of b. When the initial bias in favour of player 1 is su¢ ciently small, it is possible to use the division of the prize mass to ensure balance in the …rst contest so that the principal can achieve expected e¤ort equal to the total prize mass. For intermediate values of b, this is not attainable, but saving the whole prize for contest two yields the most expected e¤ort. When the lead of player 1 at the outset is too large, the principal can do no better than to run a single (biased) contest.
Key to achieving full dissipation of the prize is making the …rst contest balanced. This requires dividing up the prize mass so that bV 1;1 = V 2;1 , giving b v as the second contest prize. The parameter restriction in part (i) of Proposition 1 derives from the fact that b v 2 [0; 1]. 12 Figure 2 indicates how the second-contest prize depends on the initial bias in favour of player 1, increasing in this bias until v = 1 is reached, and then falling to zero when the bias is too large.
When the …rst contest is balanced, each player has an equal probability of being the victor there. In the second contest, each player has valuation v of winning, and from (1), one can see that each player has the same expected e¤ort in that , which is decreasing in the second-period balancing prize. Expected e¤ort in contest two is
, which exactly neutralizes the e¤ect that b v has on …rst-contest e¤ort, leaving an expected e¤ort of 1.
With the …rst contest balanced, the players compete away the full value of the total prize, each ending up with an overall payo¤ of zero. To see this, note that, in the balanced contest, i;1 = 
, it is no longer possible to balance the …rst contest, since doing so would require b v > 1, which is ruled out by assumption. It is well known that distributing the whole prize in contest one will give an expected e¤ort of . For intermediate values of b, part (ii) of Proposition 1 shows that it is possible to get some bene…t from the possible catching-up by player 2 by awarding the whole prize mass in contest two. This works as long as the catching-up parameter of player 2 is su¢ ciently large (a 2 > a 1 b). We show in the Appendix that, when the …rst contest is not balanced, the total expected e¤ort in the two contests is
which is linear in v. Thus, the optimum decision for the principal depends on the sign of a 2 a 1 b. When a 1 b > a 2 , the principal can do no better than setting v = 0, . Figure 3 indicates the total expected e¤orts achieved, which are X = 1 for su¢ ciently low values of b, and falling in b after this.
More than two contests
While the previous Section o¤ers a complete solution of the two-contest case, the question remains whether it would be in the interest of the principal to split the competition into even more rounds than two. In the present Section, we provide an answer to this. In particular, we delineate cases where it is in the interest of the principal to have more than two rounds of contests in order to enlarge the scope for full rent dissipation.
In constructing a series of more than two contests, we assume that the momentum/win e¤ect is multiplicative; when contest t is about to be played, and player 1 has won m of the previous t 1, the bias for each competitor is a 14 In our extended model, we retain the assumption from the twocontest case that the initial laggard can catch up and surpass the leader. The key to full rent dissipation is again balancing the …rst contest. As in the two-contest case, when the …rst contest is balanced, the value of the game to each player is zero, since they compete away the full value of the prize mass in expectation. We present below a condition such that, in the general case, the …rst contest is balanced and there is full rent dissipation across the sequence of contests.
, that the sequence consists of T 2 contests, and that the principal allocates her total prize fund of 1 over the T contests such that the prize in contest t 2 f1; :::; T g is v t 0, and P T t=1 v t = 1. The …rst contest in the series is balanced, and the total expected e¤ort equals the total prize fund, when
; t = 2; ::::; T:
Since the left-hand-side of (9) is at least zero, balance requires that the righthand-side be non-negative. When T = 2, we see, from (10), that 2 > 0 for
b, consistent with part (i) of Proposition 1. If, on the other hand, T = 2, and a 2 (1+a 1 ) a 1 (1+a 2 ) < b, then 2 < 0, and a series of two contests cannot be balanced. Figure 4 depicts how the sign of the t depends upon the initial bias parameter b.
This …gure shows that, for
; the principal can obtain a balanced …rst contest by using three contests, T = 3. Increasing b outside of this interval means that 2 ; 3 < 0, and a fourth contest must be added to achieve balance, and so on for further increases in b. Note that the critical value of b making t positive can be expressed as the ratio between two geometrical series. As we increase the number of contests, the restriction gets weaker and weaker, modulo the other restriction of b < a 2 a 1 . From (10), we have that t > 0 for
Hence, the series of critical values for the initial bias parameter t that makes t positive increases as each new contest is added. 15 However, it may not be possible 15 Also, @ t @a1 < 0, and
to achieve full rent dissipation for all b 2 1;
, as detailed in the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Consider a prize structure v t 0, t = 1; 2; :::::; T . Full rent dissipation can be achieved for b 2 1;
, then full rent dissipation can be achieved for b 2 1;
There are three types of asymmetry captured by the model: the initial bias in favour of player 1, and the rates of momentum following a contest win. Achieving full rent dissipation involves adding contests until the …rst one is balanced. In order to do this, the asymmetry cannot be too large, and this is the essence of Corollary 1. If the initial asymmetry is too large (b > a 2 a 1 ), then the …rst contest cannot be balanced by adding more since player 2 cannot catch up the lead; if the momentum of the initially disadvantaged player 2 is too large (a 2 > a 1 a 1 1 ), then player 1 cannot catch up if the rival pulls ahead.
A reward scheme for achieving full rent dissipation consists of any combination of non-negative prizes that sum to 1 and solve (9); when there are more than two prizes on o¤er, there will hence not be a unique solution. As an example, consider a 1 = 1:2, a 2 = 2, b = 1:3. This implies 2 = 0:11667, so that two contests cannot be used to create balance, and a third one must be added. We can calculate 3 = 0:25278, so that balance in the …rst contest requires 0:3v 1 = 0:11667v 2 + 0:25278v 3 ; and (11)
where (11) follows from insertions into (9). Figure 5 depicts combinations of …rst-contest and third-contest prizes in (v 3 ; v 1 ) space for this example. The v 1 (v 3 ) line in the …gure is the locus of combinations of the two prizes that satisfy the two equations (11) and (12), in addition to the non-negativity constraints v t 0, t 2 f1; 2; 3g. At point y in the …gure, the …rst-contest prize is at zero and we have the prize vector (v 1 = 0; v 2 = 0:68; v 3 = 0:32). At point z, it is the second-contest prize that is at zero, and the prize vector is (v 1 = 0:46; v 2 = 0; v 3 = 0:54). In between the two extremes, the third-contest prize moves in the range [0:32; 0:54].
First-and-last prize schemes
With only two equations to tie down the pro…le of T rewards, the exact prize structure cannot be determined. It is possible to determine the system by specifying that the principal will just use two prizes, one in the …rst contest and one in the last; this is represented in Figure 5 by the point z. We have the following Corollary to Proposition 2 for this "…rst-and-last"prize scheme:
Corollary 2 With a series of T contests, the principal obtains full rent dissipation by distributing the prize fund strictly between the two contests 1 and T , keeping v 2 
where T is de…ned in (10).
Note, from (10), that
By inserting from (10) into (14), we can derive the following comparative-statics properties of this …nal-contest prize:
If the initial bias in favor of player 1 increases, and/or if the gain to this player from winning increases, then the …nal contest prize should be increased, as long as (13) is still satis…ed. Saving the prize mass until later encourages the laggard to stay in the game, …ghting for the possibility of winning a large reward at the end of the series. The more the disadvantaged player gains from winning a contest, the more of the prize mass it is optimal to have early. This gives the initial laggard a large incentive to win early, catching up and surpassing the initial leader. As the number of contests in the series becomes larger, the principal should give a larger share of the spoils early to balance the contest. This is easily seen from (9), since T is increasing in T and all prizes from v 2 through v T 1 are zero in this particular reward scheme. The principal induces most e¤ort in the …rst contest, since the following contests are simply for position, with a modest prize in the end. Note, however, that the …nal prize is always positive.
There is an interesting interplay between the comparative-statics e¤ects noted above. Ceteris paribus, increasing the initial bias b makes it optimal to shift prize mass to late in the series. However, this also increases the number of contests that must be used in order to achieve full rent dissipation, which lowers the optimal …nal prize. This can be illustrated by recalling the numerical example in which a 1 = 1:2, and a 2 = 2, and where we vary the initial bias b and the number of contests T ; at b = 1:3 and T = 3, this example is identical to the one used in conjunction with Figure 5 above. In the following table, for each row, a "+" indicates the contest in which t turns positive. Two contests can be used for a low value of the initial bias (b = 1:1), with most of the prize mass given in the …rst contest. With a bias of b = 1:3, three contests are utilized and more than half of the prize is distributed in the …nal contest. Four contests are used for biases of 1:5 and 1:6, with the …nal prize increasing in b. When the initial bias is at 1:66, which is close to its top level at
, …ve contests are necessary, and here we see that the amount of prize that is awarded late falls from 0:85 with b = 1:6 to 0:64 with the higher bias parameter. As discussed above, the increase in the bias parameter tends to increase the late prize, whereas the fact that it is awarded one contest later reduces the late prize.
As noted, the simple reward scheme in Corollary 2 is not the unique one that balances the …rst contest. But there is no other reward scheme that achieves this goal by using fewer contests in the series. To see this, consider (9). If the lefthand side is positive (i.e. v 1 > 0), then the right-hand side must also be. Hence contests must be added until we …nd T such that T > 0, just as in the simple scheme above. If v 1 = 0, then the right-hand-side must sum to zero, so that the early negative values of t must be canceled out by the …rst positive one, just as above. Hence, we can state the following:
Corollary 3 A reward scheme in which v 1 > 0, v T > 0, v 1 + v T = 1, and v 2 ; ::::; v T 1 = 0, and where (9) is satis…ed, achieves balance in contest one with the fewest number of contests possible, which is the lowest T such that T > 0.
It is not di¢ cult to construct examples in which a reward scheme uses more contests than that in Corollary 3. Suppose for instance that the principal wants to divide the prize mass as equally as possible across contests, whilst still maintaining balance, so that all contest prizes after the …rst are of equal value v, whilst the prize in contest one is v 1 > 0, and v 1 + (T 1) v = 1. The condition for balance in this case is
requiring that P T t=2 t > 0. As an illustration, return to the numerical example above, and put b = 1:5. The condition P T t=2 t > 0 is not ful…lled for four contests, so the principal must use …ve in this instance, one more than discussed above. Contest one is balanced in this case for T = 5, v 1 = 0:188, and v 2 = v 3 = v 4 = v 5 = 0:203. A more even distribution of the prize mass thus requires more contests in order to preserve balance.
Extensions
Heterogeneity tends to reduce expected e¤ort in a single contest, and the previous sections have highlighted the circumstances under which a principal can use a sequence of contests in order to elicit full prize dissipation. Adding contests has been shown to facilitate this for larger and larger values of the initial degree of heterogeneity. In this Section, we return to a sequence of two contests, relaxing some core assumptions. First, we consider how the scope for balance is changed when the principal can o¤er a negative …rst-contest prize;
16 then we relax the assumption that the momentum from winning is constant, allowing it to depend on the size of the prize won in the …rst contest.
Negative prizes
In the analysis above, we restrict prizes to be non-negative. This is a natural restriction to impose in many circumstances, which is why we have maintained it in our main analysis. But the same set of contestants competing several times does open for up the possibility of making some prizes negative. With two contests, the second contest prize would have to be positive in order to give the players an incentive to compete at that stage; the …rst contest prize can be negative, but the contestants will still be interested in winning in order to build up a momentum which is then used to secure the large prize in the following contest. It is conceivable that a negative prize is linked to the momentum achieved by the contest winner; a …rst contest winner may have the possibility of undertaking a costly activity (training or taking a course) that increases his ability to compete at the next opportunity.
To see the e¤ect of allowing negative prizes, we consider …rst the case of T = 2. The crucial e¤ect of allowing negative prizes is that now v can be above 1, since 16 We would like to thank a referee for suggesting this. the budget can be balanced by putting the …rst-contest prize 1 v below zero. The restrictions are rather that, for both players, the value of taking part in the two-contest competition is at least as great as not taking part, i.e., it is the case that V i;1 , the value of winning the …rst contest, is non-negative. This limits the size of the negative …rst contest prize. Recalling the de…nition of b v in (8), we have the following optimal prize structure and expected e¤orts when a negative …rst-contest prize is allowed:
Proposition 3 Let T = 2, with the prize in contest one equal to (1 v) and that in contest two equal to v. When negative prizes are allowed, the optimal setting of v, and the corresponding realized total expected e¤orts, are as follows:
, with total expected e¤orts 1.
, with total expected e¤orts Note that, according to Proposition 3, part (i), the principal uses the same prize formula as before, but this now extends beyond v = 1, hence implying a negative prize in contest one, for b 2
. Also, as b approaches a 2 a 1 from below, v approaches a 1 > 1. The optimal second contest prize is illustrated in Figure 6 , in which the thick line represents the case in which a negative …rst contest prize is allowed, whilst the thin line replicates the depiction in Figure 2 where this is not possible.
The e¤ect of allowing a negative …rst-contest prize on total expected e¤orts is depicted in Figure 7 , in which the thicker lines are the e¤orts from Proposition 3. It is apparent that the principal now can use the prize split to extend the range of b for which X = 1 to include b 2
, compared to the case of non-negative prizes. Moreover, the optimal prize split now gives greater e¤orts also in the interval b 2 ), even though the optimum prize split is not. The negative prize in the …rst contest would tend to dampen competition there, but the fact that the winner gains momentum going into contest two pulls e¤ort in the other direction. Additionally, the …nal prize is large due to the budget constraint of the principal, and this incites extra e¤ort in contest two.
It is natural to ask the question as to what can be achieved with the possibility of negative prizes in longer series of contests. The next proposition gives a simple answer:
Proposition 4 Suppose T = 3; v 1 < 0; v 2 = 0; v 3 > 0; v 1 + v 3 = 1. Then full rent dissipation is achieved for all b < Here we consider a …rst-and-last reward scheme in which the …rst contest prize is negative, and the third and …nal one is positive such that the whole prize mass is used up. In the case of two contests, it is possible to increase the range of the initial heterogeneity for which full dissipation occurs, but not to cover the whole interval considered. Introducing a third contest -in which the second one is purely for position -potentially allows the initial laggard to catch up a larger lead by the time the third-contest prize is awarded. Both contestants …ght hard to gain an advantageous position to win this prize, and full rent dissipation ensues.
Prize-dependent momentum
In the analysis so far, the amount of momentum gained by a winner has been independent of the size of the prize attained. In some contexts, there may be a natural connection between the prize and the momentum; a research group that wins a project will be able to build up a bigger team when a grant is large, compared to another who achieves seed funding, for example. Beviá and Corchón (2013) and Möller (2012) have investigated this possibility in the case of Tullock contests. We show here that balance and full rent dissipation can still be achieved in our model with all-pay auctions. We return to the case of two contests, in which player 1 has an initial bias of b > 1. The principal divides the prize into v 1 + v 2 = 1 over the two contests, and the size of the bias in the second contest is bf 1 (v 1 ) if 1 wins contest one, and f 2 (v 1 ) if 2 wins it. We assume further that
, so that this formulation encompasses that in Section 3. In Section 3, we had v 1 = 1 v, v 2 = v, and f i (v 1 ) = a i ; 8v 1 ; i 2 f1; 2g. We have the following result. 
then the total amount of e¤ort expected over the two contests is equal to 1.
When f 2 (v 1 ) > b, the initial laggard overtakes the bias of player 1 if he wins the …rst contest; that this degree of catching up is necessary for the full dissipation result is also a feature of our previous analysis. Balancing contest one requires (15) to be ful…lled, and in this case the full value of the prize is dissipated.
As an example, consider
where 0 captures the momentum e¤ect associated with the …rst-contest prize, and = 0 is the case examined in Section 3. Solving (15) gives the following result. and that the win advantage of player i is given by (16). The optimal …rst-contest prize is
where
When = 0, we have that v 1 (0) = 1 b v, where b v is given in (8). Hence, the same condition as before (
monotonically decreasing in , converging to 0 as gets large. Hence, 1 > v 1 ( ) 0 for all values of , given that it holds for = 0. Furthermore, @v 1 ( ) @b < 0, whenever b is such that the optimal solution exists; this is in line with the …nding from Section 3 and Figure 2 (which depicts the second round prize as increasing in b).
17 As an illustration, consider the numerical example used previously, with a 1 = 1:2, a 2 = 2, b = 1:1, which gives the depiction of v 1 ( ) in Figure 8 .
The stronger is the connection between the momentum achieved from winning the …rst contest, and the size of the …rst-contest prize, i.e., the higher is , the lower the principal sets that prize. A larger bias makes it more di¢ cult to balance the series of contests, and hence the principal neutralizes the e¤ect of the prizedependent momentum by moving prize mass later on. When an early winner can use the prize to boost future winning chances, the prize distribution gets skewed in favour of the late prize.
Conclusion
Rivals often face each other in competition repeatedly, and the experience of winning or losing is suggested to a¤ect future competitions. A winner may gain some physiological or psychological momentum, or some material gains that makes competing relatively easier, in line with the saying that "success breeds success", or "winning makes winners". In such a situation, it is easy to think that a laggard may simply give up, rendering the competition as a futile method for inducing e¤ort.
We have looked at conditions under which a principal may divide a prize mass among a sequence of several contests in order to induce e¤ort, when strength or ability evolves according to previous wins and losses. The synergy created between the contests in the series can be exploited in order to achieve full rent dissipation even if the rivals are not equally strong at the outset.
In order to derive this result we have shown that the initial laggard must have the possibility of catching up and surpassing his rival's strength in the course of the play. This echoes the leapfrogging requirement in the patent race of Fudenberg, et al. (1983) . We have characterized the result completely for the case of two interlinked contests. We have also presented conditions under which the principal can expect the whole value of the prize fund to be dissipated in longer series. To achieve this, the principal must set the optimal number of contests, and set an appropriate prize division across these contests. We have shown that a particularly simple scheme can be used, and that this minimizes the number of contests needed in the series. The principal should just place weight on the …rst and the last prize in the series, rendering intermediate rounds as contests for position to win the …nal prize. In some applications, such awarding of prizes may not be possible; researchers compete yearly for grants, for example, and not one every few years. If the principal has access to a more or less even stream of …nancing for the prize (a research council with a yearly budget for example), we have demonstrated that balance can still be achieved -with ensuing full rent dissipation in expectationalbeit at the cost of having to use more contests. Allowing for negative prizes -if these are feasible for the application considered -reinforces the full rent dissipation result, since this can be achieved in as little as three contests for all feasible levels of the initial heterogeneity.
In our model, the e¤ort-maximizing principal seeks to design a series of contests that balances the boost from winning and the negative e¤ect of losing; the instruments at her disposal are the number of contests used and the division of the prize mass between them. Our model is highly stylized and can be seen as a …rst attempt to model the heterogeneity than can arise in dynamic contests due to previous contest results. In particular, future work should focus on the modelling of the momentum emanating from wins and losses. We have mainly assumed a …xed exponential e¤ect, and this may be easily defended for short series of contests, but is more problematic for longer ones. The amount that a competitor can gain from winning many times is likely to fall as the number of wins increases, so that the winner advantage does not increase inde…nitely. We will pursue these avenues in future research.
A Appendix
Equilibrium in the stage game of Section 2 Let F i (x) be the cumulative distribution function of player i's mixed strategy, i 2 fs; wg. The expected payo¤s of the two players are given by
The equilibrium of this game is well known, and the following Lemma is stated without proof.
Lemma 1
The game has a unique equilibrium given by the mixed strategies
Proof of Proposition 1 Consider the second contest, where the prize is v and there is no future contest. We use the results from Section 2 to calculate expected e¤orts and payo¤s. Suppose …rst that player 1 has won the …rst contest, in which case the bias parameter of this player is a 1 b. In terms of Section 2, we have player 1 as the stronger one, with s = a 1 b, w = 1, and v s = v w = v, and the following equilibrium values:
where the number in brackets identi…es the winner of the …rst contest.
When player 2 wins the …rst contest, we have to consider two di¤erent cases, A and B, depending on who is the stronger player in contest two.
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A) a 2 b. In this case, player 2 is the stronger player, and we use (1) and (2) to get
Here player 1 is still the stronger player, despite losing contest one, but with less of a bias in his favour than he had earlier. Equilibrium values are
Turning to contest one, we set up the expected payo¤ functions for the players, where k 2 fA; Bg denotes the case, as discussed above following a win for player 2 in contest one:
Winning the …rst contest gives the stage prize of 1 v and the continuation value after having won: k 1;2 (1) for player 1 and k 2;2 (2) for player 2, k 2 fA; Bg. Losing gives the promise of k i;2 (j) in the next contest, for i 6 = j and k 2 fA; Bg. The contest success function is biased in favour of player 1, who has a bias of b. If player 2 wins contest one, then he expects a positive payo¤ in contest two in case A, and zero in case B; he expects zero if he loses the …rst contest. Player 1 expects a positive losing payo¤ only in case B.
Player i is guaranteed k i;2 (j) 0 in the …rst contest in case k = fA; Bg; this is his expected payo¤ in contest two if he loses contest one. Player 2 has no positive guaranteed payo¤, though; i.e., 
Consider …rst case B, where clearly player 1 is stronger, since bV
We have, from equations (3) and (4),
Given this, we can calculate the total expected e¤ort over the two contests for case B as
which is decreasing in v, since a 1 > 1, so that v = 0 is the optimal contest-two prize for a principal who wants to maximize total expected e¤ort. This gives
19 This can be veri…ed since the condition amounts to b > 1. With balance in contest one, total expected e¤ort in that contest, by equations (6), (A3), and (A4), is
and win probabilities are , by equation (A2). Thus, total expected e¤orts across the two contests when contest one is balanced is 1 2
This is obviously the best the principal can obtain, so the principal's choice is to get contest one balanced by putting v = b v; this proves part (i) of the Proposition. Consider next part (ii). Now, b v > 1. This means that it can never be the case that player 2 is the stronger player in contest 1, since this would require v b v. Thus, in the present case, we have 0 v < b v, so that bV (4), (A3), and (A4), total expected e¤ort in contest 1 is now
while the win probability of the weak player 2 in contest 1, by equation (3), is
By again using equations (A1) and (A2), we have that total expected e¤ort over the two contests is
This is linear in v and depends upon the sign of a 2 a 1 b.
,it is optimal to set v = 0, with a total expected e¤ort of , and the expression is increasing in v, which should be set at the top of its range, i.e., at v = 1, for a total expected e¤ort of
. In the knife-edge case of b = a 2 a 1 in part (iii), the principal is indi¤erent, since any v 2 [0; 1] makes contest one balanced.
Proof of Proposition 2
Let the history of the game up until contest t 2 f2; :::; T g be summarized by (m t ; n t ), where m t (n t ) is the number of wins so far by player 1 (2), and m t + n t = t 1. We extend the notation from Section 3 to let the payo¤ to player i in contest t be given by i;t (m t ; n t ).
With this notation, we can express the requirement of a balanced …rst contest. From Section 2, we have that a contest is balanced when s v s = w v w . Player 1 is the strong player in contest 1, since he has an ex-ante bias. We have s = b, w = 1, v s = v 1 + 1;2 (1; 0), and v w = v 1 + 2;2 (0; 1). Thus, contest 1 is balanced when b v 1 + 1;2 (1; 0) = v 1 + 2;2 (0; 1), or:
Consider a contest t 2 f2; :::; T g where player 1 is strong whenever m t > n t , whilst player 2 is strong whenever m t n t .
20 If m t > n t + 1, then player 2 only …ghts for the stage prize at t, and not for the continuation value of being the leader after contest t, since player 1 will be strong in contest t + 1 whatever the outcome in contest t. Hence, following the analysis in Section 2, we have
In turn, working out i;t+1 (m t + 1; n t ) j mt>nt+1 reveals that player 1 is strong at each continuation, and we can by backward recursion …nd
Similarly, if m t < n t , then player 2 is strong in contest t+1, whatever the outcome of contest t. By the same reasoning as above,
20 Analysis of the two-contest case has shown that full dissipation is achievable only if the initial laggard can catch up to a su¢ cient degree. The assumption made here ensures this. Restricting attention to this case is not limiting. To see this, note that we could have considered the case where player 1 is strong in contest t if and only if m t > n t + 1, the case where player 1 is strong in contest t if and only if m t > n t + 2, and so on, as far as it is appropriate. All these cases would involve the calculations we present below. The important point for the result is that player 2 is strong if each have won equally many times; such catching up is necessary for the principal to be able to balance the …rst contest.
Hence, we can write the value for player 2 of winning contest 1, with t = 2, n 2 = 1, and m 2 = 0, as
Consider next the value for player 1 of winning contest 1, 1;2 (1; 0), the determination of which follows 1;2 (1; 0) = v 2 + 1;3 (2; 0)
where, by (A8), we can write
The challenge is now to …nd an expression for 2;3 (1; 1), since the continuation value here is positive for the player who wins contest 2. We write Substituting in these expressions, we have 
; t = 2; ::::; T Combining this with (A7) gives the result. To show that a balanced contest yields full rent dissipation involves computing the expected e¤orts at each node in the game tree, and multiplying by the probability that the node is reached. Denote by X 2 (1; 0) and X 2 (0; 1) the total expected e¤orts from nodes (1; 0) and (0; 1). Rounds of recursion from the …nal contest and backwards yields the following pattern: The value for each player of winning the …rst contest is V 1;1 (0; 0) = v 1 + 1;2 (1; 0) and V 2;1 (0; 0) = v 1 + 2;2 (0; 1). From (4) this gives a total expected e¤ort in contest one of When the …rst contest is balanced, v 1 + 2;2 (0; 1) = b v 1 + 1;2 (1; 0) , and the probability of each player winning is 1 2 (i.e. nodes (1; 0) and (0; 1) are reached with equal probability). Using balance, the total expected e¤ort X is . This requires T > b. Note, from (10), that
so that the value of T increases in T , reaching in the limit T !1 = a 1 (a 2 1) a 2 (a 1 1)
. for which there is no T such that T > b, and no possibility of achieving T > 0 which is required for balance and full rent dissipation.
Proof of Proposition 3
The participation constraints for the contestants in contest one are V i;1 0; i = 1; 2, where V 1;1 and V 2;1 are given in equations (A3) and (A4), respectively. Part (i) follows from Proposition 1 and the observation that, in this case, balance requires bV 1;1 = V 2;1 , implying that V for a 2 > a 1 :
Proof of Proposition 5
Expected e¤orts and payo¤s in contest two, following a win by player 1, are, by the discussion in Section 2, x 1;2 (1) + x 2;2 (1) = 1 v 1 bf 1 (v 1 ) ;
1;2 (1) = bf 1 (v 1 ) 1 bf 1 (v 1 ) (1 v 1 ) ;
2;2 (1) = 0:
Following a win by player 2 there are two cases, but we focus on the one in which player 2 is strong in contest two having won the …rst, b < f 2 (v 1 ). Expected e¤ort and payo¤s are then The payo¤ functions in contest one can be written as 1;1 = p 1;1 v 1 + 1;2 (1) x 1;1 ; 2;1 = p 2;1 v 1 + 2;2 (2) x 2;1 :
The key to balancing contest one is then b v 1 + 1;2 (1) = v 1 + 2;2 (2), which is (15). The probability of each player winning contest one is now 1 2
, so that total expected e¤ort is X = 1 2 v 1 + 1;2 (1) + 1 2 v 1 + 2;2 (2) + 1 2 x 1;2 (1) + x 2;2 (1) + 1 2 x 1;2 (2) + x 2;2 (2) Retaining the assumption that a 2 > a 1 b, we see that is a convex function of v 1 for > 1, concave for < 1, and linear for = 1. The graph of has positive slope and negative value at v 1 = 0; the value at v 1 = 0 is independent of . It can readily be determined that @ @ > 0 for v 1 > 0; this implies also that the root of is decreasing in , i.e., @v 1 @ < 0. It is straightforward to determine the solutions for v 1 when = 0 and = 1.
has a single positive root for > 1, since it now is convex. Consider next the case of < 1. Only roots below 1 are valid solutions. The value of at v 1 = 1 is ( + a 1 ) ( + a 2 ) (b 1) > 0. Since < 0 at v 1 = 0, and positive at v 1 = 1, the roots are real. To see that only one of the roots is below 1, consider the slope of measured at v 1 = 1:
2 + (a 1 + a 2 1) (b 1) + (a 2 a 1 b) > 0, for all . It follows that is positive-valued and increasing at v 1 = 1, so that the larger root must be above 1. The lower root, which coincides with the single positive root for > 1, is given in the Corollary. > 0 at = 0, it is positive for all . This implies that the root of falls as b increases (up until the point at which b is so large that v 1 ( ) < 0 in which case balance can no longer be achieved in the …rst contest).
